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Rules for Donations to Tissue Banks — What Next?
Leonard Glantz, J.D., Patricia Roche, J.D., and George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
Michael Crichton’s Next1 is a fictional creation of
multiple catastrophes emanating from the reallife case of John Moore, in which the California
Supreme Court ruled in 1990 that Moore did not
own his cells after they were removed from his
body.2 As human tissue has become commercially useful, and as tissue banks storing and
providing samples for research have flourished,
the question of who owns the tissue has become
more vital. Next got mixed reviews, but even many
scientists, such as Michael Goldman, who reviewed the book in Nature, agree with Crichton
that it is imperative that we “establish clear
guidelines for the use of human tissue” in medical research.3 Legal opinions from Florida4 and,
most recently, Missouri5 supplement the Moore
case and together provide a foundation on which
to build these guidelines.

The C a se of John Mo ore
In 1976, John Moore was treated for hairy cell
leukemia by hematologist–oncologist David W.
Golde at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). As is standard procedure for the
treatment of this disease, Golde recommended
the removal of Moore’s spleen, which had enlarged from about 1/2 lb (0.2 kg) to more than 14
lb (6.4 kg). Moore improved quickly after the surgery. Golde took a sample from the spleen and
isolated and cultured an immortal cell line capable of producing a variety of valuable products,
including the lymphokine granulocyte–macrophage colony-stimulating factor. In 1983, UCLA
applied for and was granted a patent on the cell
line. Moore had been returning to California to
see Golde about every 6 months. He told an interviewer that he never would have known about
the existence of the cell line had Golde not called
him in September 1983 and told him he had
“missigned the consent form” (circling I “do not”
grant instead of I “do” grant UCLA all rights in
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“any cell line”). Moore consulted an attorney and
filed suit against UCLA and Golde in 1984.6
Moore in the Court of Appeals

The trial court decided that Moore had no rights
to his cells. Moore brought his case to a California Court of Appeals, which in 1988 reversed the
trial court’s decision.7 Judge David Rothman,
writing for the 2-to-1 majority, focused on just
one issue: If Moore could prove the facts he alleged regarding “conversion” — or theft — of his
cells, would he win the lawsuit under California
law? Conversion involves a civil lawsuit that essentially claims that a defendant wrongfully took
or retains the plaintiff’s property. The plaintiff
must prove ownership or right to possession of
the property at the time of the conversion, wrongful conversion or disposal of the property, and
damages.
According to California statute, “The ownership of a thing [property] is the right of one or
more persons to possess and use it to the exclusion of others.” Although we are unaccustomed
to thinking of the human body as property, the
court noted that “the essence of property interest — and the ultimate right of control . . . exists with regard to one’s own body.” This finding
negated the defendants’ position that everyone
but the source of the cells could own them.
Similarly, the defendants’ contention that a diseased spleen that has been removed from a patient is a thing of no value was negated by the
fact that the cells from the spleen formed the
foundation of a multimillion-dollar industry.
The defendants next argued that the removed
spleen was “medical waste” that Moore abandoned for the physicians to dispose of as they
saw fit; consequently, there was no conversion or
wrongful disposal. Rothman found that if the
spleen had been disposed of by “internment or
incineration,” in accordance with the usual practice, Moore could not complain. But the judge
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concluded, “Any use . . . not within the accepted understanding of the patient is a conversion” because it cannot be presumed “that the
patient is indifferent to” other uses, such as
commercial exploitation.7 The dissenting judge
would have dismissed the case because he found
Moore’s claim trivial, and the tissue to be “like
unformed clay or stone transformed by the
hands of a master sculptor into a valuable work
of art.”7 The dissenting judge also thought that
allowing patients to sell or otherwise profit from
their organs and tissues would impede medical
progress.7
Since Moore was not claiming that his spleen
itself was valuable but rather that Golde had
used it to make a product of value, and since
there was no precedent directly on this point,
the appeals court opinion offers novel arguments on the question of who owns the result
when raw materials are converted into a valuable product. For example, under ancient Roman
law, when agricultural crops were in the ground,
they were owned by the landowner, but picked
fruits and vegetables were owned by the farmer
who worked the land. Trees taken from the
land, however, belonged to the landowner. Is a
removed spleen more like an ear of corn or an
oak tree? Is Moore like a landowner (who owns
his body) and the doctor like a farmer (who
plucks fruit)? Rothman made another analogy
to refute the conclusion that a diseased spleen is
worthless. He noted that even though a landowning farmer might pay an oil company to remove oil that is ruining the corn crop, the farmer is still entitled to a share of the refinery’s
profits from the product of the land.7 Likewise,
even if the physician–researcher owns the created cell line, he may still owe the patient something.
Since the cells in human tissue are living and
reproduce, perhaps they are more analogous to
farm animals than to fruits or vegetables. The
progeny of animals are the property of the mother’s owner. Is the cell line equivalent to Moore’s
“progeny”? Similarly, an owner wrongfully deprived of livestock is owed the value of the eggs
from converted chickens and milk from converted cows.6 Are Moore’s immortal cells like chickens, and the protein products derived from them
like eggs? The need to resort to cases that involve the ownership of corn, trees, cows, and eggs
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demonstrates the need to create modern rules
that deal directly with the ownership and use of
human tissue.
Moore in the California Supreme Court

The California Supreme Court ignored all of these
potentially useful, if somewhat amusing, property analogies. It simply decided that Moore’s
physician should have disclosed his financial interest in using his patient’s spleen for research
and commerce but that Moore had no property
interest in his cells after they had been removed
from his body.2
The court’s reasoning was straightforward but
unsophisticated. The court noted, for example,
that California statutes that govern the disposition of excised tissue do not give property rights
to patients but failed to note that these statutes
deal only with tissue removed from corpses. The
court also argued that the patented cell line was
“both factually and legally distinct from the
cells taken from Moore’s body.”2 This is true,
but as the appeals court noted, it does not mean
that Moore has no interest in the fruits of the
discoveries that required the use of his unique
cells.
The underlying reason for the California Supreme Court’s ruling against Moore on the issue
of property can be found in its statement of public policy: “The extension of conversion law into
this area will hinder research by restricting access to the necessary raw materials [and] destroy
the economic incentive to conduct important medical research.”2

Greenber g v. Miami Children’s
The next major case was from Florida.4 The plaintiffs were families affected by Canavan disease, a
spongiform degeneration of the central nervous
system. They had persuaded Dr. Reuben Matalon
to try to identify the gene responsible for the disease and were active creators and supporters of
the research, not merely tissue providers. They
created and maintained the Canavan Registry, a
repository for their tissue samples and medical
information, and engaged Matalon with the goal
of developing an affordable and widely accessible
genetic test for Canavan disease. Matalon successfully identified the gene and subsequently developed prenatal and carrier tests for the disease.
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Without the plaintiffs’ knowledge, Matalon
obtained a patent for the relevant genetic sequence, thereby securing the rights of his employer, Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, to control genetic testing for Canavan
disease in clinical care as well as research. Miami Children’s exercised its patent rights in a
way that the plaintiffs believed defeated the
purpose for which they had joined forces with
Matalon in the first place. They had not provided resources (tissue samples, information, and
funds) with the understanding that these resources would be used for the economic benefit
of Matalon or his institution but had done so to
develop an affordable diagnostic test. The plaintiffs had six specific claims, and the trial judge
dismissed five of them.4
One claim was similar to one made in Moore
— the wrongful conversion of the plaintiffs’
property, with the property being the samples
(and the information derived from them) held in
the Canavan Registry. The judge noted that under Florida law, conversion “is an unauthorized
act which deprives another of his property permanently or for an indefinite time.” Application
of this law involves two inquiries: whether property was involved, and if so, whether the requisite deprivation or misuse of that property occurred. The trial judge declined “to find a
property interest in body tissue and genetic information voluntarily given to defendants.”4 This
conclusion was based primarily on the fact that
under Florida law “the property right in blood
and tissue samples . . . evaporates once the sample is voluntarily given to a third party.”4
Nevertheless, the judge went on to consider
whether the tissue samples were used for a purpose unintended by the plaintiffs. He found that
the tissue samples were used only for medical research (as intended by the plaintiffs) and so concluded that there could be no liability for conversion. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim that they
had not provided samples to be used for commercial purposes, he drew a distinction between
commercialization of the material in the Canavan
Registry and commercialization of the fruits of
the research conducted by using the material
in the registry. In this case, the fruits were identified as the patented material (the genetic sequence).
Similar to the ruling by the California Su-
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preme Court in Moore, the Florida ruling reflected
the judge’s concern that a finding for the plaintiffs would “cripple medical research.”4 This
ruling, then, was as pragmatic and result-driven
as that in Moore, but it does add another element: in Moore, the property at issue comprised
the tissue and the cells that were produced from
it; in Greenberg, the property questions involved
the tissue and access to a diagnostic test developed using the tissue. In both cases, patents were
used to make the products derived from the tissue more valuable.

The C a se of William C atalona
The Missouri dispute began when Dr. William
Catalona, a prominent researcher on prostate cancer, decided to leave Washington University in St.
Louis for Northwestern University in Chicago and
to take “his” tissue samples with him.5 These
samples were collected from patients who had
signed research consent forms that authorized the
storage and use of their tissue for future research.
Before leaving, Catalona sent 10,000 letters to his
former patients asking them to sign and return an
enclosed form that read as follows:
I have donated a tissue and/or blood sample for Dr. William J. Catalona’s research
studies. Please release all samples to Dr.
Catalona at Northwestern University upon
his request. I have entrusted these samples
to Dr. Catalona to be used only at his direction and with his express consent for
research projects.5
Six thousand patients returned completed
forms. Washington University filed suit against
Catalona, asking the court to declare that the
university was the exclusive owner of the tissue
repository and the samples in it.
According to the reasoning in Moore and Matalon, people own their tissues when the tissues are
part of their bodies, but ownership becomes less
clear once it is separated from the body. Nonetheless, the tissues still must be controlled by
someone, whether for proper disposal or other
use. And the way law thinks about control of objects is through property law, especially when
there is a transfer from one entity to another. The
transfer of property usually takes one of two
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forms — a sale or a gift. Since the tissues were
not sold in Catalona, the question was whether a
gift was made, and if so, to whom.
Catalona’s form letter indicates that he believed the tissue was “donated” to him — that
he was the recipient of a gift. But if this were
so, he would have no reason to write the letter
to the donors in the first place. If the tissue was
a gift to Catalona, he could have asked the university directly to transfer “his” blood and tissue
samples. If a grateful patient had given Catalona
a first-edition medical text, when Catalona
moved to a new university he would not have
asked that patient to write to the university asking it to transfer the book to him. He would
simply have taken it with him. Alternatively, if
the patient had given the book to the university
library, even in Catalona’s name, he could not
take it without the university’s permission.
A gift consists of three elements: First, the
donor must have the present intent to make a
gift. Second, the property must be transferred
from the donor to the recipient. Finally, the recipient must accept the gift, at which moment it
belongs to the recipient. Once a gift is made,
the donor has no further property interest. It is,
nonetheless, possible to make a conditional gift.
For example, a person could create an endowment for a university to conduct cancer research,
but no other type of research, with a stipulation
that the money be returned if it is ever used for
another purpose. A person can also condition a
gift on the occurrence of an event. A case cited
by the appeals court involved the ownership of
an engagement ring given in contemplation of
marriage when the wedding was called off. The
court ruled that the ring was to become a gift at
the time of the wedding. Because the groom
cancelled the wedding, and the bride was prepared to marry and meet the condition of the
gift, the court decided that the ring was hers.5,8
The appeals court agreed with the trial court
that an unconditional gift of tissue was made to
Washington University, not to Catalona. The
court based this conclusion on its findings that
the consent forms signed by the patients were
Washington University forms, the patients were
directed to university personnel for answers to
questions, the university controlled and paid for
the repository, and the university controlled the
use of the samples. Moreover, Catalona was at
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all times employed by the university and worked
on its behalf, and there was no indication that
any patient had made a direct gift to him.5,9

The Confusion
The conflicts that ultimately brought these cases
to court were the result of confusion over who
had ultimate control of the tissue samples from
which various products were derived. The confusion was shared by the physicians who collected
the samples, the institutions that stored the samples, the people who provided the samples, and
the corporations that patented the products.
Analysis of the court opinions also demonstrates
a profound lack of clarity in the minds of the
judges as to what types of law should be used to
resolve the novel legal questions presented. Since
there are virtually no judicial precedents, the
courts have had to resort to analogies that have
proven difficult to apply and have sometimes created more confusion than clarity in the law.
An example of role confusion is found in the
form, titled “Medical Consent and Authorization,” that Catalona sent to his patients. Despite
its title, this document is not a medical consent
form; it is simply a request to transfer property.
This is a mischaracterization, but how should
we characterize people who provide their tissue
for banking? Throughout the Catalona opinion,
they are referred to as research participants.5
Both parties to the lawsuit and the courts apparently viewed research participants and tissue
providers as identical. But this is a serious conceptual error that adds more problems to the
matter of tissue collection, storage, and use
than it purports to solve.
Research subjects have substantial rights. In
addition to consenting at the outset, they have
the right to discontinue playing the role of research subject at any time.10 They never make
an irrevocable “gift” of themselves. A person
can be in a clinical trial and not provide tissue.
But a person can also provide tissue and not be
a research subject. When these two distinct
roles are confused, problems are created. The
distinct roles are easier to see when other types
of property are involved. For example, a subject
in a clinical trial may give the researcher a computer and thus be a both a research subject and
a donor. As a research subject, she can, under
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the law, terminate her participation in the research, but she is not entitled to get the computer back because it was a gift over which she
has lost control. Tissue donors are no more research subjects than computer donors are.
This role confusion also exists in the minds
of federal regulators. Current guidance from the
Office for Human Research Protections states:
“Under the definition of human subject at 45
CFR 46.102(f), obtaining identifiable private information or identifiable specimens for research
purposes constitutes human subjects research.
Obtaining means receiving or accessing identifiable private information or identifiable specimens for research purposes.”11
As the Catalona court points out, the guidance issued by this office — as opposed to regulation — is not law and is not binding. The
Office for Human Research Protections argues
that the mere obtaining of “identifiable specimens” for “research purposes” is itself research.
According to this definition, it is possible for
there to be a research subject in the complete
absence of any research. The collection of money, equipment, personnel — or tissue samples
— in the contemplation of research, which may
or may not ever be conducted, is not research.
The Office for Human Research Protections
thus makes the same conceptual error the courts
make. A piece of tissue, identifiable or not, constitutes neither research nor a research subject.
At some point it may be used for research, at
which time identifiable information might be
derived about the donor, and it is the use of the
tissue for research that requires human subject
protection.
The classification of tissue providers as research subjects also raises the difficult and unresolved problem of terminating participation
— if tissue providers are the same as research
subjects, they should be able to discontinue
their participation at any time. But what does
this mean? Catalona argued this meant that tissue providers continue to have control over samples and can have the samples returned to them
or transferred to someone else, such as Catalona. Washington University argued that discontinuance meant that the university could destroy
the samples, continue to store them without using them, or remove all identifiers from them.
But if Washington University had been the recipient of an unconditional gift, as it argued,
302
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the tissue provider could not require any of
these actions. It is as if the generous donor who
made a gift of the first-edition textbook could at
any time require the library to destroy the book
or remove it from use. This makes no sense as a
matter of law.
The Catalona case nonetheless helps clarify
the legal status of human tissue. It is property.
It starts out as the property of the person from
whom it is taken, it can be given by the person
to an institution or to another person, and the
nature of the gift is determined by the intent of
the giver. Traditional standards of property law
apply to human tissue removed from a living
person.5 On the other hand, by confusing tissue
providers with human subjects — and gift law
with human subject regulations — the case also
adds to the current confusion.12

Re solving the Confusion
Resolving the confusion requires a recognition
that the rules of protection for human subjects
cannot reasonably be applied to tissue donation.
Collecting and storing human tissue is not research, nor is it new, experimental, or even controversial. Human tissue is treated as property
under the law, but the continuing controversies
about the appropriate use of human tissue, including its use as a commercial product, suggest
that human-tissue donation needs its own rules
and standards. Agreement on such standards has
eluded tissue collectors to date, but Catalona may
provide the catalyst to move us to the next phase:
regulating tissue donation and banking by creating, by means of statute or best practices, a formalized process for tissue donation. Analogies
to crops, livestock, oil, and even books and computers are simply inadequate.
A formalized process for human-tissue donation should require explicit recognition that a
gift is being made, should identify the recipient
of the gift, and should specify whether the gift
is conditional or unconditional. If a conditional
gift is intended, the donor must specify the conditions, including any requirement that the tissue be destroyed if those conditions are not met.
The statutory approach would be to draft a law
similar to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
which governs the donation of dead bodies and
tissue removed from corpses. Such a law would
(or at least should) also determine under what
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circumstances, if any, people would be permitted to sell their tissue and what buyers could do
with it. Current federal law, for example, prohibits the purchase or sale of human organs for
transplantation, and current national voluntary
guidelines prohibit the purchase and sale of human ova, at least for stem-cell research.13,14
Clear rules for collecting and storing human
tissue would benefit both collectors and providers.15 On the other hand, it is worth emphasizing
that these rules will not resolve the question of
what can be done with the stored tissues — in
either existing or future collections. The reason is
that before it was possible to analyze DNA, the
primary legal issue was the property issue addressed in Moore: Who owned the tissue and its
products? With the advent of DNA analysis, the
property question has been joined with a privacy
question: What can be done with the personal,
private information encoded in human tissue?
This issue is starkly presented, for example, by
the “consent and legal agreement” form used by
23andMe, one of the new Web-based personal genetics companies. The form states that “after
analysis, your remaining DNA and saliva samples
will be destroyed.” The agreement also states,
however, that the information derived from the
DNA can be used by the company and its partners
“as part of our scientific research with the purpose of advancing the field of genetics.” We have
previously suggested a comprehensive law protecting genetic privacy to address this concern.16,17 Of
course, if the stored tissue samples cannot be
linked to individual donors, the privacy issue disappears and property concepts can be used exclusively to establish tissue-bank practices.
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